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A B S T R A C T
Eﬀort discounting theory suggests that the value of a reward should be lower if it was eﬀortful to obtain, whereas
contrast theory suggests that the contrast between the costly eﬀort and the reward makes the reward seem more
valuable. To test these alternative hypotheses, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as
participants engaged in feedback-based learning that required low or high cognitive eﬀort to obtain positive
feedback, while the objective amount of information provided by feedback remained constant. In the low eﬀort
condition, a single image was presented with four response options. In the high eﬀort condition, two images
were presented, each with two response options, and correct feedback was presented only when participants
responded correctly to both of the images. Accuracy was signiﬁcantly lower for the high eﬀort condition, and all
participants reported that the high eﬀort condition was more diﬃcult. A region of the ventral striatum selected
for sensitivity to feedback value also showed increased activation to feedback presentation associated with the
high eﬀort condition relative to the low eﬀort condition, when controlling for activation from corresponding
control conditions where feedback was random. These results suggest that increased cognitive eﬀort produces
corresponding increases in positive feedback-related ventral striatum activity, in line with the predictions made
by contrast theory. The accomplishment of obtaining a hard-earned intrinsic reward, such as positive feedback,
may be particularly likely to promote reward-related brain activity.
1. Introduction
Human behavior is motivated by a wide variety of goals, from
simple goals, such as getting to work on time, to more complex goals,
such as ﬁnishing a major project. The reward experienced when a goal
is achieved depends on the value one places on the goal. The ventral
striatum (VS) has been shown to play an important role in processing
goal values, both for extrinsic, or tangible, outcomes (such as food
rewards and monetary gain or loss) (Knutson et al., 2001; Kurniawan
et al., 2013; Tricomi and Lempert, 2015) and for intrinsic, or
nontangible, outcomes (such as positive and negative feedback during
learning) (Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2003; Lutz et al., 2012;
Dobryakova and Tricomi, 2013; DePasque Swanson and Tricomi,
2014).
However, goal value is inﬂuenced not only by expected outcomes,
but also by the eﬀort required to achieve those outcomes (Braver et al.,
2014; Westbrook and Braver, 2015; Kurniawan et al., 2013).
Depending on the context in which the goal has to be attained, more
or less eﬀort might be expended to achieve a goal. For example,
acquiring a good grade for a class that required 20 h of work per week
might be more rewarding than getting the same grade for a class that
required only 5 h of work per week. In this example, the same outcome
is preceded by diﬀerent amounts of eﬀort. Thus, the experienced
reward value of an outcome is context-dependent and related to the
amount of eﬀort expended to achieve a reward.
There are two theories that make opposite predictions about how
eﬀort exerted during goal-directed actions impacts outcome valuation.
According to eﬀort discounting theory, eﬀort decreases outcome value,
such that rewards from eﬀortful actions are devalued due to the greater
amount of eﬀort required to perform them (Botvinick et al., 2009).
Thus, in the above example, a good grade for a class that required only
5 h of work per week would be more rewarding than a good grade that
required 20 h of work per week. This principle has been shown to hold
in the context of both physical (Kurniawan et al., 2010, 2013;
Skvortsova et al., 2014) and cognitive eﬀort requirements (e.g. Kool
et al., 2010). In accordance with eﬀort discounting theory, human
neuroimaging studies show that outcomes associated with greater
eﬀort lead to decreased activity of the VS (Botvinick and Rosen,
2009, Kool et al., 2010, McGuire and Botvinick, 2010).
On the other hand, according to contrast theory, outcomes resulting
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from increased eﬀort would be valued more due to a greater contrast
between the aversive action and the rewarding nature of the outcome
(Singer et al., 2007; Zentall and Singer, 2007). Thus, in the above
example, a good grade for a class that required 20 h of work per week
would be more rewarding than a good grade that required only 5 h of
work per week. While neuroimaging evidence is lacking, contrast
theory would predict increased activation of the VS in association with
outcomes that follow eﬀortful actions.
The focus of previous eﬀort-based decision-making studies has
primarily been on how extrinsic (e.g., monetary) outcomes are antici-
pated and valued after diﬀerent degrees of eﬀort (e.g. Botvinick and
Rosen, 2009; Croxson et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2012), and whether
individuals prefer, or are more likely to choose, high vs. low eﬀort
actions (e.g. McGuire and Botvinick, 2010; Kool and Botvinick, 2013).
Less is known about the processing of less tangible outcomes, such as
the knowledge that one has answered correctly. Unlike money, this sort
of performance feedback has no value outside of the task, and there-
fore, its value is quite subjective (Labroo and Kim, 2009; Braver et al.,
2014). Thus, in the current study, we examined the eﬀect of varying
cognitive eﬀort demand on VS activity and outcome valuation during
learning with performance-related feedback.
Participants were presented with a trial-and-error learning task, in
which they had to learn to associate abstract images with speciﬁc
responses based on the feedback presented after each trial. Cognitive
eﬀort was manipulated to be greater in one condition than the other
through increased diﬃculty. As both the aﬀective and informative aspects
of feedback activate the striatum (Tricomi and Fiez, 2012; Smith et al.,
2016), we kept the initial amount of information provided by feedback the
same across conditions. Further, two additional conditions were presented
that did not require cognitive eﬀort. For these two conditions, participants
had to respond with either one or two button presses, without feedback
reﬂecting their performance accuracy. This design allowed us to compare
1) neural activation associated with outcomes after high and low cognitive
eﬀort, as well as 2) neural activation associated with outcomes obtained
without any cognitive eﬀort. On the basis of the competing theories, we
had two alternative hypotheses: the eﬀort discounting hypothesis predicts
that rewards earned after high cognitive eﬀort would produce less VS
activation than rewards earned after low cognitive eﬀort, whereas the
contrast theory hypothesis predicts that rewards earned after high
cognitive eﬀort would produce more VS activation than rewards earned
after low cognitive eﬀort.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty-four individuals participated in the experiment for $50
each in monetary compensation. All participants provided written
informed consent. Data from one participant were not included in
the main analysis due to a diagnosed brain abnormality. Data from one
other participant were not included due to the participant not being
able to ﬁnish the experiment. Therefore, data from 22 participants were
analyzed (9 females; age M=23.3 years, SD=5.4). The research was
approved by the Institutional Review Board of Rutgers University.
2.2. Materials
A 3-Tesla Siemens (Erlangen, Germany) Trio scanner was used to
acquire all MRI data. Behavioral data acquisition and stimulus
presentation was administered using the “E-Prime” software
(Schneider et al., 2002).
2.3. Procedure
2.3.1. Scan session
A T1-weighted pulse sequence was used to collect structural images
in 41 contiguous slices (3x3×3 mm voxels). Similarly, 41 functional
images were collected using a single-shot echo EPI sequence amount-
ing to 142 acquisitions (TR=2500 ms, TE=25 ms, FOV=192 mm, ﬂip
angle=80°) tilted 30° from the AC-PC line (Deichmann et al., 2003).
2.3.2. Behavioral paradigm
Participants had to learn through trial-and-error to associate
abstract images with one of the four speciﬁc buttons. Speciﬁcally,
participants were presented with two learning conditions that repre-
sented high and low cognitive eﬀort conditions, and two random
feedback conditions that required no cognitive eﬀort but only a motor
response. In the 1-step learning condition (low cognitive eﬀort),
participants were presented with one abstract image and had to
respond with one of the four buttons, only one of which led to the
presentation of the correct feedback (green √). The other three buttons
led to the presentation of the incorrect feedback (red X) (Fig. 1).
During the 2-step learning condition (high cognitive eﬀort), parti-
cipants were presented with two abstract images, side by side (Fig. 1).
Participants had to respond to both images. First, participants had to
respond to the image on the left side of the screen with buttons 1 or 2.
Then, participants had to respond to the second image on the right side
of the screen with buttons 3 or 4. Participants were presented with
cumulative feedback after they responded to both images. Correct
feedback was presented only when participants responded correctly to
both images. At all other times, incorrect feedback was presented. The
side each of the images was presented on remained consistent
throughout the experiment. Importantly, feedback provided the same
amount of information in both the 1-step and 2-step learning condi-
tions. That is, since there are four possible responses per trial in both
learning conditions, there is an initial 25% chance of being correct in
each trial (as learning progresses, the observed probability of making a
correct response diﬀers based on accuracy). The 2-step condition
required more eﬀort than the 1-step condition, however, because it
places more demands on working memory, as it requires two images
and two responses to be held and updated in working memory.
The 1-step and 2-step random conditions resembled the learning
conditions described above in all respects, except that feedback did not
reﬂect participants' accuracy (i.e. correct and incorrect feedback
Fig. 1. Depiction of trials for 1-step (low eﬀort) and 2-step (high eﬀort) conditions. 1-
step random and 2-step random conditions resembled the above set-up; however,
random feedback did not reﬂect performance accuracy.
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presentation was random). Participants were informed that feedback
during random conditions would not reﬂect their performance and that
there was no correct response associated with the stimulus. They were
also instructed to press any of the four buttons during these conditions.
As the control conditions should not require cognitive eﬀort, they
control for other diﬀerences between the 1-step and 2-step conditions,
such as the need to make two button presses in the 2-step condition.
Each trial started with a ﬁxation point (jittered 1–6 s; 4.5 s on
average, uniform distribution) that contained a label informing parti-
cipants of the condition they were in. The stimulus screen was
presented for four seconds and, during this time, participants had to
indicate their response. At the end of the 4 s, the feedback screen was
presented for one second. Four diﬀerent stimuli (or pairs of stimuli, for
the 2-step conditions) were shown in each condition (constituting a
block of 4 trials), and each block was presented a total of 12 times each
over the course of the experiment, amounting to 48 trials of each
condition (192 total trials per participant). There was no inter-stimulus
interval (ISI) from the response screen to feedback, as previous
research has shown that delaying feedback can decrease reliance on
the striatum (Foerde and Shohamy, 2011; Foerde et al., 2013). A
ﬁxation point was presented in between the diﬀerent blocks (jittered 1–
6 s; 4.5 s on average, uniform distribution). The stimuli for each
condition were consistent across the study, but trial order and block
order were pseudo-randomized for each participant, with each stimulus
appearing four times in each 6-minute scanning session.
2.3.3. Questionnaires
At the end of the experiment, participants were given a question-
naire that inquired: 1) whether they preferred feedback after the 1-step
or the 2-step learning conditions, 2) during which condition they felt
more engaged in the task, 3) in which condition learning was harder
and 4) whether random feedback presentation was rewarding.
Questions 1 and 4 were speciﬁcally targeted at understanding whether
participants’ preferences support eﬀort discounting (1-step learning
condition; 1-step and 2-step random conditions) or contrast theory (2-
step learning condition). Questions 3 was a manipulation check, so that
we could see whether the 2-step learning condition was perceived as
more eﬀortful.
2.4. Data analysis
2.4.1. Behavioral data
Accuracy data from the two learning conditions were analyzed by
means of two-tailed paired t-tests. Since the random conditions did not
involve any learning, and it was not possible to correctly respond to
stimuli, accuracy results were not analyzed for this condition.
2.4.2. fMRI data
Preprocessing of the functional data was performed using the Brain
Voyager QX software (Version 2.4.2.2; Brain Innovation, Maastricht,
the Netherlands). Preprocessing included three-dimensional correction
for motion using six parameters (for the three translation and three
rotation directions). Images were spatially smoothed (8 mm, FWHM),
voxel-wise linearly detrended, and passed through a high-pass, tem-
poral ﬁlter of frequencies (3 cycles per time course). The resulting data
were normalized to the Talairach stereotaxic space (Talairach and
Tournoux, 1998). Ventral striatum coverage was veriﬁed for all
subjects.
2.4.3. GLM analysis
After image preprocessing, a whole brain analysis was performed
on the data. A random-eﬀects general linear model (GLM) analysis was
performed on the 1 s time period of feedback presentation. The
predictors of interest were: positive 1-step feedback, negative 1-step
feedback, positive 2-step feedback, and negative 2-step feedback for the
learning conditions; and positive 1-step feedback, negative 1-step
feedback, positive 2-step feedback, and negative 2-step feedback for
the random conditions. The regressors were convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function. The missed trials and six motion
parameters were also included in the model as regressors of no interest,
as well as the cue event, starting at cue onset with reaction time as the
event duration (the reaction time to the second stimulus presentation
was used as the duration in the 2-step conditions). The GLM analysis
resulted in identiﬁcation of regions of interest (ROIs) thresholded at p
< 0.001, along with a contiguity threshold of 3 (3x3×3 mm3) contig-
uous voxels, determined using the cluster-level statistical threshold
estimator in Brain Voyager (Version 2.3; Brain Innovation, Maastricht,
the Netherlands). This method performs whole-brain correction for
multiple comparisons and produces a cluster level false positive alpha
rate of 0.05. A whole brain ANOVA was conducted in order to detect
the eﬀects of valence, diﬃculty, and contingency associated with the 1-
step and 2-step learning and random conditions.
To address the main question of the study, we aimed to determine
whether the same voxels were sensitive to both feedback value (positive
versus negative feedback) and eﬀort requirements (high versus low
eﬀort). We thus performed a contrast of positive feedback versus
negative feedback, collapsing across diﬃculty and contingency, and
identiﬁed a large region centered in the ventral striatum. We then
performed a second-order analysis on the parameter estimates in the
identiﬁed voxels, comparing positive feedback from the conditions of
the two eﬀort levels [(2-step learning positive – 2-step random
positive) – (1-step learning positive – 1-step random positive)]. A
similar contrast with negative feedback was performed. Further, based
on questionnaire data about feedback preference, we looked at whether
individuals preferring feedback after either the 1-step learning or the 2-
step learning conditions had increased feedback-related VS activation
after the corresponding condition, and whether there were between-
group diﬀerences in VS activation as a function of feedback preference.
2.4.4. Prediction error (PE) analysis
As the 2-step learning condition might be more diﬃcult than the 1-
step learning condition, prediction error (PE), or the diﬀerence
between the expected and actual outcome, could diﬀer between
conditions over time, as diﬀerences in diﬃculty emerge, and positive
feedback becomes less expected for the 2-step learning condition. To
account for potential PE-related diﬀerences between conditions, PE
was included in a second GLM analysis as a parametric modulator
(GLM 2). First, we used the observed choice and accuracy data to
obtain the best-ﬁt learning rates λ and 1/ɵ parameters for all four
conditions, using the following variant of Q learning:
Q t Q t λ F t Q t( ) = ( −1) + ·( ( −1) − ( −1))i i i i (1)
Here, participants learn Qi(t), indicating the value of stimulus i on
trial t. The stimulus values were updated using Fi(t−1) which repre-
sented the feedback value (0 or 1 for negative or positive feedback,
respectively) for stimulus i on the previous trial. If that stimulus was
not observed on the previous trial, then we used the feedback value
from the previous trial on which it was observed, or 0 if this was the
ﬁrst trial on which it was observed. The learning or updating rate
parameter λ was allowed to vary from 0 to 1; large values of λ indicate
faster updating whereas small values indicate slower updating.
To predict choice probabilities we used the softmax variant of the
Luce choice rule (Luce, 1959):
P t e( ) =
∑i
Q t
e
( )/ɵi
i
I Qi t( ) ɵ (2)
The probability P of choosing option i on trial t is obtained by ﬁrst
exponentiating the product of the Q value for that option and the
inverse temperature parameter 1/ɵ. Second, this value is then divided
by the sum over all options i of the exponentiated product of the Q
value for each option and the inverse temperature parameter 1/ɵ. The
inverse temperature parameter was allowed to vary from 0.01 to 10;
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large values of 1/ɵ indicate more deterministic choosing whereas small
values indicate more random choosing.
We found the best ﬁtting parameters for each condition separately
by maximizing the negative log likelihood of the behavior over all
participants (a ﬁxed eﬀects approach), given the model. The conditions
were ﬁt separately due to the expected (and observed) diﬀerences in
choice accuracy, reﬂecting the possibility that participants either
learned at diﬀerent rates or diﬀered in the stochasticity of their choices
between the diﬀerent conditions, a common technique when responses
diﬀer signiﬁcantly (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002; Schmidt et al., 2014).
To determine the ﬁt quality of the model in the diﬀerent conditions, we
then calculated the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz,
1978) – a criterion that penalizes additional free parameters – for each
condition, and then compared each to the BIC from a 0-parameter
baseline model that assumes participants merely choose options at
random. For a model to outperform the baseline model on the BIC,
participants must choose according to a pattern which the model
eﬃciently (i.e., in terms of free parameters) captures. The best ﬁtting
parameters for each model in each condition and their BIC values are
shown in Table 1. In the BIC formulation used here, lower values
indicate a better ﬁt to the behavior. As can be seen in Table 1, the
learning model outperforms the baseline model for both learning
conditions, indicating that there is indeed a pattern in their choice
behavior and the learning model eﬃciently captures it. Since the BIC
values for the two random conditions were inferior compared to the
BIC for the 0-parameter model (thereby indicating that behavior in a
random condition is not well described by a learning model, as would
be expected), we conducted the GLM analysis using the PE regressors
from the two learning conditions only.1 Using the best ﬁtting para-
meter values, we computed the PE values for each trial. The resultant
PE values were used as parametric modulators of task-related activa-
tion, modeled at the onset times of outcome presentation for the 1-step
and 2-step learning conditions and convolved with a hemodynamic
response function.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results
3.1.1. Accuracy
Fig. 2 displays accuracy results for the two learning conditions. A
two-tailed paired t-test revealed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in accuracy
between the two conditions, showing that participants learned sig-
niﬁcantly better in the 1-step learning condition than in the 2-step
learning condition, t(21)=5.37, p < 0.001.
3.1.2. Reaction time (RT)
A within-subjects ANOVA was performed on participants’ RT with
diﬃculty (2-step vs. 1-step) and contingency (learning vs. random) as
within-subject factors. The ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant interaction of
diﬃculty and contingency (F(21,1)=6.95, p < 0.05) and a main eﬀect of
diﬃculty (F(21,1)=18.6, p < 0.0001) and of contingency (F(21,1)
=248.73, p < 0.0001) (Supplementary Fig. 1). Participants responded
faster during the 1-step conditions compared to 2-step conditions.
Similarly, participants responded faster during the random conditions
compared to the learning conditions, especially for the 2-step condi-
tion.
3.1.3. Questionnaire data
Half of the participants indicated that they were most engaged in
the task during the 1-step learning condition (11 out of 22), while
almost half of participants indicated that they were most engaged in the
task during the 2-step learning condition (9 out of 22). The rest of the
participants did not provide a clear response to this question. Similarly,
more than half of the participants (13 out of 22) indicated that
feedback in the 2-step learning condition was more rewarding, while
7 out of 22 indicated that feedback in the 1-step learning condition was
more rewarding. Two other participants did not provide a clear
response to this question. All participants responded that learning
during the 2-step learning condition was more diﬃcult. More than half
of participants (14 out of 22) indicated that random feedback was not
rewarding to them.
3.2. fMRI results
3.2.1. Whole-brain results (GLM 1)
A whole-brain, voxel-wise within-subjects ANOVA was performed
with diﬃculty (2-step vs. 1-step), contingency (learning vs. random)
and valence (positive vs. negative) as within-subject factors. An
interaction of diﬃculty by contingency by valence, as well as the
diﬃculty by contingency, resulted in activation of the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) (Supplementary Tables 1a-b). An interac-
tion of contingency by valence resulted in VS activation
(Supplementary Table 1c). The interaction results of diﬃculty by
valence are presented in Supplementary Table 1d. The results of the
main eﬀect of diﬃculty, contingency, and valence are presented in
Supplementary Tables 2a-2c.
3.2.2. High eﬀort versus low eﬀort
To determine whether the same region is sensitive to feedback value
(positive versus negative feedback) and eﬀort requirements (high
versus low eﬀort), we ﬁrst performed a contrast to identify voxels
sensitive to feedback value in general. That is, positive feedback
presentation was contrasted with negative feedback presentation, while
collapsing across diﬃculty and contingency. This contrast revealed
extensive bilateral striatal activation and VMPFC activation, in addition
to other cortical regions (Fig. 3; Table 2). Since we had a strong a priori
hypothesis focused speciﬁcally on the VS, we performed the compar-
ison of high eﬀort versus low eﬀort feedback presentation on the VS
voxels (cluster extent of 886 voxels) identiﬁed by this contrast, while
controlling for the random conditions. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences were
detected bilaterally: right VS: t(21)=3.4, p < .005; left VS: t(21)=3.4, p
< .005 (Fig. 4). A similar comparison with negative feedback did not
reveal any reliable eﬀects (right VS: 0.2, p=0.9; left VS: t(21)=0.8,
p=0.4).
Further, we hypothesized that individuals with the preference for
the low eﬀort condition (1-step learning) would show greater activation
during the feedback presentation of the 1-step learning condition,
while individuals with the preference for the high eﬀort (2-step
learning) would show greater activation during the feedback presenta-
tion of the 2-step learning condition. Parameter estimates from the
above contrast were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with
preference (1-step vs. 2-step) as a between-subject factor and eﬀort
(high vs. low) as a within-subject factor. Instead of the hypothesized
interaction, we observed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of eﬀort (right VS:
F(21, 1)=13.89, p < .005; left VS: F(21, 1)=11.2, p < .005), consistent
with the above ﬁnding of increased activity for high compared to low
Table 1
Best-fit parameters for candidate models and associated BIC scores. Lower BIC values
indicate a better fit to the behavior.
1-step
learning
2-step
learning
1-step
random
2-step
random
Baseline
model
λ 0.97 0.71 0.02 0.0 NA
1/ɵ 0.97 2.1 0.18 10 NA
BIC 2494.3 2667.0 2693.8 2803.8 2683.9
1 We also ﬁt all the subject learning data using a single learning rate parameter,
yielding a BIC value of 5189. This value is greater than and hence provides an inferior ﬁt
compared to the sum of the BIC scores for the two separate learning conditions.
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eﬀort. However, a post-hoc paired-samples t-test revealed no between-
group diﬀerences (1-step preference vs. 2-step preference group during
low eﬀort condition: t(18)=0.53, p=0.6; 1-step preference vs. 2-step
preference group during high eﬀort condition: t(18)=0.9, p=0.4).
3.2.3. Prediction error analysis (GLM 2)
The PE analysis revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of PE associated with
the 1-step learning condition in the right caudate head and other
regions in the cortex and cerebellum (Table 3a). There was also a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of PE associated with the 2-step learning condition in
bilateral MPFC (BA 10), rACC (BA 24), and the insula (Table 3b). No
signiﬁcant striatal activation was detected in association with PE for
the 2-step learning condition.
Contrasting the eﬀect of PE for the 2-step learning condition versus
PE for the 1-step learning condition (PE2-step learning > PE1-step learning)
did not reveal any signiﬁcant striatal activation (t(21)=1.04, p=0.31).
Fig. 2. A. Accuracy for the two learning conditions. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in performance between the 1-step (low eﬀort) and 2-step (high eﬀort) conditions. B. Learning
Fig. 3. A. Brain activity showing sensitivity to positive vs. negative feedback presentation (diﬃculty and contingency collapsed) (p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons). B. For
illustrative purposes, beta weights from the voxels of the left VS showing sensitivity to positive vs. negative feedback.
Table 2
Regions showing the valence sensitivity (positive vs. negative feedback presentation) (p < 0.05, corrected).
Region Cluster size (mm3) Hemisphere Peak X Peak Y Peak Z Peak F
Bilateral striatum/ventromedial prefrontal cortex 20999 L −13 10 −6 10
Cerebellum, Declive 5465 L −43 −56 −6 5.6
Cuneus (BA 16) 1308 R 11 −98 6 4.5
Cerebellum, Culmen 1272 R 20 −32 −21 5.3
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 46) 1167 R 50 34 12 5
Hippocampus 796 R 32 −8 −24 4.9
Cerebellum, Posterior lobe 432 L −22 −83 −30 4.2
Precentral Gyrus (BA 6) 376 R 44 −2 33 4.9
Cuneus (BA 19) 323 R 14 −86 39 4.6
Middle temporal gyrus (BA 37) 311 R 56 −62 3 4.7
Cerebellum, Uvula 288 R 32 −74 −24 4.5
Cuneus (BA 16) 246 L −16 −98 6 4.2
Cerebellum, Pyramis 145 R 8 −86 −27 4.1
Cerebellum, Anterior lobe 137 L −31 −35 −21 4.1
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (BA 9) 114 R 8 43 30 4.1
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This contrast revealed activation in the VMPFC as well as other cortical
areas (Table 3c), suggesting that activity in these regions was more
strongly correlated with PE in the 2-step than 1-step conditions. A
contrast of the 2-step learning versus the 1-step learning conditions,
while controlling for PE, did not reveal any signiﬁcant eﬀects in the
striatum (t(21)=0.74, p=0.47) (Table 3d).
4. Discussion
In this study, we looked at how cognitive eﬀort inﬂuences valuation
of intrinsic outcomes (performance-related feedback) and associated
striatal activity during a trial-and-error learning task. Speciﬁcally,
cognitive eﬀort was manipulated by varying the working memory load
required in diﬀerent conditions, by presenting performance-related
feedback either after a response to a single stimulus or after a sequence
of two responses to two diﬀerent stimuli. In addition, two conditions in
the current experiment did not require any cognitive eﬀort and resulted
in random feedback presentation, thus providing a visuo-motor control
for the 1- and 2-step conditions. Consistent with previous ﬁndings
(Elliott et al., 1997; Delgado et al., 2000; Tricomi et al., 2004, 2006;
Tricomi and Fiez, 2008; Dobryakova and Tricomi, 2013; Sescousse
et al., 2013; DePasque Swanson and Tricomi, 2014), we observed a
robust main eﬀect of valence in the dorsal and ventral striatum, driven
by signiﬁcant diﬀerences between positive and negative feedback
presentation in all four conditions. Furthermore, in the same voxels
that showed a sensitivity to positive versus negative feedback, we also
observed enhanced VS activation in association with the more diﬃcult
and cognitively eﬀortful condition, i.e., the feedback presentation
during the 2-step learning condition.
The 2-step learning condition was more cognitively demanding, as
reﬂected in signiﬁcantly lower performance on the 2-step learning
condition compared to the 1-step learning condition. Additionally, all
participants reported that the 2-step learning condition was more
diﬃcult to learn than the 1-step learning condition, suggesting that to
obtain positive feedback during this condition, participants had to exert
greater cognitive eﬀort than during the low cognitive eﬀort condition.
In conjunction with these behavioral results, fMRI results revealed
greater VS activation to positive feedback in the 2-step learning
condition versus the 1-step learning condition, while controlling for
the random feedback conditions. This result supports contrast theory,
which suggests that high eﬀort increases the subjective value of
rewarding outcomes, leading to increased striatal activation.
These results, however, are not in line with previous research that
has found evidence that the activation of VS reﬂects eﬀort discounting
(Botvinick et al., 2009; Croxson et al., 2009; Kool et al., 2010;
Kurniawan et al., 2010). There are several possible explanations for
the obtained results. Nuanced diﬀerences in our task design compared
to other tasks may contribute to the disparities across studies. For
example, contrast theory may depend critically on the contingency
between the eﬀort and the resulting outcome, since eﬀort that is not
seen as necessary to earn a reward is unlikely to enhance outcome
value; however, in some paradigms ﬁnding support for eﬀort discount-
ing, eﬀort and outcomes have been decoupled (Botvinick et al., 2009).
Another diﬀerence between the current task and commonly used eﬀort
paradigms (e.g., Kurniawan et al., 2010, 2013) is that participants in
our task had to exert cognitive rather than physical eﬀort. Physical
eﬀort may be less subjective as it can be directly measured with grip
devices and force transducers (Liu et al., 2000; Jiang et al., 2012;
Meyniel et al., 2013; Skvortsova et al., 2014). However, while some
studies have found increased reward-related activation for high cogni-
tive eﬀort (Stoppel et al., 2011; Satterthwaite et al., 2012; Hernandez
Lallement et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2014), there are notable exceptions
(Botvinick et al., 2009; Westbrook et al., 2013). Thus, it may be that
our task, along with other tasks which have found increased striatal
activation for high cognitive eﬀort, produce increased feelings of
competence when eﬀort demands are high, which may result in an
enhanced reward response to positive feedback (Ryan and Deci, 2000b;
Mochon et al., 2012).
Further, we used performance-related feedback, rather than more
tangible outcomes, such as money or food. Extrinsic rewards are
rewarding even in the absence of a task, whereas a green checkmark
indicating positive performance feedback is only rewarding in the
context of the task. It may be that the subjective value of positive
feedback is particularly likely to be positively linked to the eﬀort
required to earn it, and the high cognitive eﬀort condition might have
triggered motives of achievement and goal striving (McClelland, 1985;
Fig. 4. Beta weights from the voxels of the left VS showing an eﬀect of high > low eﬀort.
Random conditions are included in the contrast as a control.
Table 3a
Regions activated for the 1-step learning condition with PE as a regressor (p < 0.05, corrected).
Region Cluster size (mm3) Hemisphere Peak x Peak y Peak z Peak t
Cerebellar tonsil 3695 L −46 −53 −33 6.2
Cerebellum, Pyramis 3108 L −16 −80 −30 4.7
Caudate body 1301 R 14 7 9 4.0
Posterior cingulate cortex 1018 L −10 −32 12 4.6
Occipital lobe (BA 19) 821 L −4 −89 39 5.0
Cuneus (BA 7) 481 R 5 −71 30 3.9
Dorsal anterior cingulate 409 L −22 34 12 3.9
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10) 249 R 26 52 −9 4.0
Inferior parietal lobule (BA 7) 240 R 8 −47 45 4.3
Cerebellum, Culmen 233 L −13 −38 −9 3.7
Cerebellum, Lateral declive 221 R 32 −83 −18 3.4
Cerebellum, Lateral declive 219 L −37 −89 −18 3.8
Cerebellum, Middle declive 172 R 14 −83 −21 3.6
Inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20) 134 L −67 −26 −18 4.3
Posterior cingulate cortex 114 R 5 −32 15 3.9
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Labroo and Kim, 2009; Braver et al., 2014). Indeed, Ryan and Deci
(2000a, 2000b) suggest that humans are innately inclined to seek out
challenges, and meeting the challenge in the high eﬀort condition may
have caused the increased striatal activation to feedback. Further, there
is evidence suggesting that some individuals perceive diﬃcult, and
hence challenging, tasks as attractive. For example, DePasque Swanson
and Tricomi (2014) showed that striatal activity is modulated by
personality traits such as goals to outperform others. While we did
not assess individual diﬀerences in personality measures in this study,
such personality diﬀerences may inﬂuence the subjective value one
assigns to rewards requiring high eﬀort and related brain activity.
Another potential explanation for greater striatal activation in
association with positive feedback of the 2-step learning condition
could be that it is driven by greater prediction error, the diﬀerence
between actual and expected outcomes. That is, given that participants’
performance in the 1-step learning condition was signiﬁcantly better
than participants’ performance during the 2-step learning condition,
diﬀerences in PE between conditions could conceivably drive the result
of stronger activation associated with the 2-step learning condition that
was observed. However, our prediction error analysis showed no
signiﬁcant eﬀect of PE on striatal activation in the 2-step learning
condition, and no diﬀerence between conditions in the eﬀect of PE on
striatal activation. While unexpected, this result is in line with ﬁndings
of another study with diﬀerent levels of eﬀort demands, which found
performance-related VS activity that was not explained by task
diﬃculty (Schmidt et al., 2012). Further, Satterthwaite et al. (2012)
investigated the eﬀect of working memory load on VS activation and
observed greater VS activation in association with correct responses in
the more diﬃcult condition of a working memory task, which sup-
ported the idea that responding correctly during a more diﬃcult task
can increase reward response (Satterthwaite et al., 2012). Several other
studies show similar results (Lutz et al., 2012; Schouppe et al., 2014).
Therefore, without eliminating the possibility that the PE plays a role in
the comparison of feedback after the 2-step and 1-step learning
conditions, our results suggest that intrinsic motivation to master a
challenging task may have had an eﬀect on VS activity and outcome
valuation after the high cognitive eﬀort condition, thereby contributing
to the enhanced VS activity.
We observed activation of the MPFC, DLPFC and the ACC in
association with diﬃculty and valence. The MPFC has been shown to
play an important role in goal-directed behavior and processing of
aﬀective information (Krawczyk, 2002; Mitchell, 2011). Evidence
suggests that this region is involved in calculating action value and
subjective value of outcomes, and can provide aﬀective information
about decision options, causing a person to favor a speciﬁc outcome
option (Kringelbach, 2005; Padoa-Schioppa and Cai, 2011; Young and
Shapiro, 2011). Thus, this region may be involved in processing the
aﬀective information provided by feedback in our task, and possibly in
weighing the value of positive feedback relative to the eﬀort costs to
achieve it. The DLPFC has been implicated in working memory,
planning, reasoning and in integration of information over time
(Krawczyk, 2002), suggesting it may play a role in updating action-
response associations in our task, especially in the more demanding 2-
step learning condition. The ACC has been shown to be involved in
eﬀort exertion (Walton et al., 2003; Engström et al., 2014) and
evaluating eﬀort costs (Croxson et al., 2009; Prévost et al., 2010;
Skvortsova et al., 2014). Furthermore, ACC activation reﬂects the
unexpectedness of an outcome, regardless of valence (Jessup et al.,
Table 3b
Regions activated for the 2-step learning condition with PE as a regressor (p < 0.05, corrected).
Region Cluster size (mm3) Hemisphere Peak X Peak Y Peak Z Peak t
Medial prefrontal cortex (BA 9) 3492 L −13 46 18 5.2
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) 2375 R 38 22 −6 4.8
Cuneus (BA 18) 1586 R 5 −89 18 3.8
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9) 1384 R 56 16 21 4.9
Anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24) 1358 R 11 19 21 4.2
Middle occipital gyrus (BA 19) 897 R 23 −65 −6 5.2
Superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) 583 L −52 −53 18 4.2
Supplementary motor area (BA 6) 321 L −7 28 51 3.8
Superior temporal gyrus (BA 41) 267 L −46 28 3 3.4
Insula (BA 13) 235 L −37 22 −9 4.0
Superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) 208 R 50 −20 −3 4.0
Middle occipital gyrus (BA 19) 189 L −40 −83 15 3.8
Superior frontal gyrus (BA 8) 179 R 5 40 42 3.5
White matter/insula 173 R 29 16 21 3.8
Primary motor cortex (BA 4) 172 L −7 −8 69 4.0
Cerebellar tonsil, Cerebellum 172 R 23 −53 −42 4.5
Supplementary motor area (BA 6) 142 R 8 19 48 4.1
White matter/rostral anterior cingulate 113 L −7 25 3 3.9
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) 106 L −43 22 15 3.5
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10) 103 R 44 46 0 3.9
Table 3c
Regions identified by the contrast of PE of the 2-step learning positive versus 1-step learning positive feedback presentation (p < 0.05, corrected).
Region Cluster size (mm3) Hemisphere Peak X Peak Y Peak X Peak t
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) 853 R 56 16 18 4.1
Insula 853 R 38 19 −6 4.2
Medial frontal gyrus (BA 9) 686 L −13 46 18 4.6
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) 500 R 26 34 3 4.4
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) 301 L −46 28 6 3.7
Precentral gyrus 200 L −52 −5 12 3.8
Fusiform gyrus (BA 19) 187 R 23 −65 −6 4.1
White matter/cerebellum 100 R 14 −26 −43 3.6
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2010; Alexander and Brown, 2011), and rewards are less expected in
our 2-step learning condition, which had a lower observed probability
of success. This network of prefrontal regions, together with the
striatum, may process feedback value and support the feedback-based
associative learning necessary for our task.
4.1. Limitations
4.1.1. Questionnaire results
The questionnaire results do not fully support the idea that
participants explicitly value intrinsic outcomes after a more eﬀortful
condition. As stated above, only slightly more than half of the
participants perceived feedback after the 2-step learning conditions
as more rewarding, while the others preferred feedback presentation
after the easier 1-step learning condition. Yet, both groups displayed
greater neural activation to positive feedback for the 2-step than the 1-
step learning condition. While self-report might not be the most
reliable measure (e.g. no correlation has been found between executive
control and self-report measures (Nęcka et al., 2012)), greater activa-
tion of the VS cannot be solely explained by the notion that the
outcome following the high eﬀort is more valuable. It is possible that
the VS is responding to aspects of high eﬀort trials other than value,
such as increased arousal or attention. Alternatively, it could be that
individual diﬀerences in the degree to which a person enjoys a
challenge might serve as a mediator for the observed results. Future
research will be necessary to determine whether implicit valuation of
eﬀortfully earned rewards may diﬀer from explicit valuation, or
whether other aspects of our high eﬀort condition were responsible
for driving activity in the VS for the high eﬀort condition.
Further, we used participants’ preferences to divide the sample into
two groups. However, we did not ﬁnd any diﬀerences in striatal
activation in association with participants’ preferences. This may be
due in part to a small sample size of the two groups (7 participants
preferring feedback after the 1-step learning condition; 13 participants
preferring feedback after the 2-step learning condition). Future studies
should examine how individual diﬀerences (e.g. need for achievement,
level of intrinsic motivation) aﬀect outcome preferences and striatal
activation after variable degrees of cognitive eﬀort.
4.1.2. Control conditions
As during the learning conditions, participants were asked to
respond to the cue during random conditions by pressing whichever
button they liked. The random conditions were included in the design
as control conditions, as they help to reduce potential confounds that
may be caused by aspects of the design, such as the need to make two
button presses in the 2-step condition. Psychologically, the random
conditions should not be perceived as cognitively eﬀortful, and random
feedback in these conditions is less likely to be rewarding. While the
observed activation to feedback presentation during the random
conditions is unexpected (see Supplementary materials), having re-
sponse options might potentially explain the observed activation as it
have been shown to be associated with perceived control (Bown et al.,
2003; Leotti et al., 2010). Additionally, the VS activation for the 1-step
random condition was greater than for the 2-step random condition,
which is in line with the idea that conditions that diﬀer only in physical
eﬀort may produce a pattern of activation consistent with eﬀort
discounting, whereas increased cognitive eﬀort requirements are more
likely to produce activation consistent with contrast theory. Indeed, in
the random conditions in our task, positive feedback would not be
expected to be personally meaningful or to produce feelings of
competence that might drive increased reward-related activation when
participants succeed in a challenging cognitive task.
4.2. Conclusion
The results of the current study show that, while individual diﬀerences
might play a role in outcome interpretation after learning, intrinsic
outcomes that follow high cognitive eﬀort during learning drive activation
of the VS, a region that plays a key role in the processing of rewarding
outcomes. These results are consistent with the notion advanced by contrast
theory that rewards earned through high eﬀort have higher subjective
reward value than rewards earned through low eﬀort. This is not to say that
contrast theory holds in all circumstances, but rather, that whether eﬀort
discounts or enhances reward value may depend heavily on context.
Contexts that involve cognitive eﬀort to earn intrinsic rewards, such as
positive feedback, may be especially likely to increase the subjective value of
the earned reward. This may explain why our proudest moments are not
instances when rewards fall in our lap, but rather, times when hard work
pays oﬀ to yield a desired outcome.
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Table 3d
Regions identified by the contrast of 2-step learning positive versus 1-step learning positive feedback presentation, with PE included in the model (p < 0.05, corrected).
Region Cluster size (mm3) Hemisphere Peak X Peak Y Peak Z Peak t
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex/rostral anterior cingulate cortex 13234 R 8 22 45 5.6
Superior temporal gyrus (BA 42) 3230 L −58 −32 18 4.8
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10) 1135 R 41 40 −3 4.9
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) 1049 R 38 19 −9 4.9
Dorsal posterior cingulate cortex 797 L −7 −50 33 4.1
Inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20) 706 R 56 22 9 4.3
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 46) 659 L −43 37 6 3.8
Dorsal middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) 498 R 59 −35 −12 4
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9) 370 R 20 49 30 4
Supplementary motor area (BA 6) 172 L −43 4 42 3.6
Middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) 165 R 62 −17 −12 4.2
Medial prefrontal cortex (BA 10) 146 L −28 37 21 3.6
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) 134 L −37 25 −9 3.4
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) 132 L −43 19 15 3.6
Middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) 117 L −58 −44 0 3.4
Cerebellar tonsil 80 R 26 −53 −42 3.9
E. Dobryakova et al. NeuroImage 147 (2017) 330–338
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Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.12.
029.
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